Proceedings 7th International Workshop on
Edited by: Michele Boreale and Steve Kremer
Security Issues in Concurrency
Bologna, Italy, 5th September 2009
This volume contains the proceedings of the 7th Workshop on Security Issues in Concurrency (SecCo'09). The workshop was held in Bologna, Italy on September 5th 2009, as a satellite workshop of CONCUR'09. Previous editions of this workshop have been organized in Eindhoven (2003), London (2004), San Francisco (2005), Lisbon (2007) and Toronto (2008).
The aim of the SecCo workshop series is to cover the gap between the security and the concurrency communities. More precisely, the workshop promotes the exchange of ideas, trying to focus on common interests and stimulating discussions on central research questions. In particular, we called for papers dealing with security issues (such as authentication, integrity, privacy, confidentiality, access control, denial of service, service availability, safety aspects, fault tolerance, trust, language-based security, probabilistic and information theoretic models) in emerging fields like web services, mobile ad-hoc networks, agent-based infrastructures, peer-to-peer systems, context-aware computing, global/ubiquitous/pervasive computing.
We received 11 submissions (including two short papers). We eventually accepted 5 long papers which are included in this volume. Two short papers were also selected for presentation at the workshop. We also had an invited talk by Riccardo Foccardi. The selection has been carried out by the program committee of SecCo'09, which consisted of
- Michele Boreale (co-chair)
- Gérard Boudol
- Mads Dam
- Anupam Datta
- Stéphanie Delaune
- Joshua Guttman
- Steve Kremer (co-chair)
- Gavin Lowe
- Pasquale Malacaria
- Catuscia Palamidessi
- Geoffrey Smith
We would like to thank all the persons that contributed to
SecCo'09. First of all, the program committee, the invited speaker,
the authors and all the participants that attended the workshop. We
are also very grateful to the CONCUR'09 workshops chair, Ivan Lanese,
for taking care of all the local organization. We thank the editors
of EPTCS (who will publish these proceedings electronically in the
Firenze and Cachan, July 15, 2009
Riccardo Focardi (University of Venice, Italy)
Matteo Maffei (Saarland University, Germany)
We revise existing type-based analyses of security protocols by devising a core type system for secrecy, integrity and authentication in the setting of spi-calculus processes. These fundamental security properties are usually studied independently. Our exercise of considering all of them in a uniform framework is interesting under different perspectives: (i) it provides a general overview of how type theory can be applied to reason on security protocols; (ii) it illustrates and compares the main results and techniques in literature; (iii) perhaps more importantly, it shows that by combining techniques deployed for different properties, existing type-systems can be significantly simplified.
Work partially supported by the initiative for excellence of the German federal government and by Miur'07 Project SOFT: "Security Oriented Formal Techniques"