A Simple Semantics and Static Analysis for Stack Inspection

Anindya Banerjee
David A. Naumann

The Java virtual machine and the .NET common language runtime feature an access control mechanism specified operationally in terms of run-time stack inspection. We give a denotational semantics in "eager" form, and show that it is equivalent to the "lazy" semantics using stack inspection. We give a static analysis of safety, i.e., the absence of security errors, that is simpler than previous proposals. We identify several program transformations that can be used to remove run-time checks. We give complete, detailed proofs for safety of the analysis and for the transformations, exploiting compositionality of the eager semantics.

In Anindya Banerjee, Olivier Danvy, Kyung-Goo Doh and John Hatcliff: Semantics, Abstract Interpretation, and Reasoning about Programs: Essays Dedicated to David A. Schmidt on the Occasion of his Sixtieth Birthday (Festschrift for Dave Schmidt), Manhattan, Kansas, USA, 19-20th September 2013, Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 129, pp. 284–308.
Published: 19th September 2013.

ArXived at: http://dx.doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.129.17 bibtex PDF
References in reconstructed bibtex, XML and HTML format (approximated).
Comments and questions to: eptcs@eptcs.org
For website issues: webmaster@eptcs.org