Imitation in Large Games

Soumya Paul
(The Institute of Mathematical Sciences, Chennai)
R. Ramanujam
(The Institute of Mathematical Sciences, Chennai)

In games with a large number of players where players may have overlapping objectives, the analysis of stable outcomes typically depends on player types. A special case is when a large part of the player population consists of imitation types: that of players who imitate choice of other (optimizing) types. Game theorists typically study the evolution of such games in dynamical systems with imitation rules. In the setting of games of infinite duration on finite graphs with preference orderings on outcomes for player types, we explore the possibility of imitation as a viable strategy. In our setup, the optimising players play bounded memory strategies and the imitators play according to specifications given by automata. We present algorithmic results on the eventual survival of types.

In Angelo Montanari, Margherita Napoli and Mimmo Parente: Proceedings First Symposium on Games, Automata, Logic, and Formal Verification (GANDALF 2010), Minori (Amalfi Coast), Italy, 17-18th June 2010, Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 25, pp. 162–172.
Published: 9th June 2010.

ArXived at: http://dx.doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.25.16 bibtex PDF

Comments and questions to: eptcs@eptcs.org
For website issues: webmaster@eptcs.org