Negotiation Games

Philipp Hoffmann
(Technische Universität München)

Negotiations, a model of concurrency with multi party negotiation as primitive, have been recently introduced by J. Desel and J. Esparza. We initiate the study of games for this model. We study coalition problems: can a given coalition of agents force that a negotiation terminates (resp. block the negotiation so that it goes on forever)?; can the coalition force a given outcome of the negotiation? We show that for arbitrary negotiations the problems are EXPTIME-complete. Then we show that for sound and deterministic or even weakly deterministic negotiations the problems can be solved in PTIME. Notice that the input of the problems is a negotiation, which can be exponentially more compact than its state space.

In Javier Esparza and Enrico Tronci: Proceedings Sixth International Symposium on Games, Automata, Logics and Formal Verification (GandALF 2015), Genoa, Italy, 21-22nd September 2015, Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 193, pp. 31–42.
Published: 23rd September 2015.

ArXived at: http://dx.doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.193.3 bibtex PDF
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