Bayesian Games with Intentions

Adam Bjorndahl
Joseph Y. Halpern
(Cornell University)
Rafael Pass
(Cornell University)

We show that standard Bayesian games cannot represent the full spectrum of belief-dependent preferences. However, by introducing a fundamental distinction between intended and actual strategies, we remove this limitation. We define Bayesian games with intentions, generalizing both Bayesian games and psychological games, and prove that Nash equilibria in psychological games correspond to a special class of equilibria as defined in our setting.

In R Ramanujam: Proceedings Fifteenth Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK 2015), Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, USA, June 4-6, 2015, Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 215, pp. 99–113.
Published: 23rd June 2016.

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