Signed Networks, Triadic Interactions and the Evolution of Cooperation

Simone Righi
(MTA TK "Lendület" Research Center for Educational and Network studies (Recens))
Károly Takács
(MTA TK "Lendület" Research Center for Educational and Network studies (Recens))

We outline a model to study the evolution of cooperation in a population of agents playing the prisoner's dilemma in signed networks. We highlight that if only dyadic interactions are taken into account, cooperation never evolves. However, when triadic considerations are introduced, a window of opportunity for emergence of cooperation as a stable behaviour emerges.

In Alex Graudenzi, Giulio Caravagna, Giancarlo Mauri and Marco Antoniotti: Proceedings Wivace 2013 - Italian Workshop on Artificial Life and Evolutionary Computation (Wivace 2013), Milan, Italy, July 1-2, 2013, Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 130, pp. 104–107.
Published: 30th September 2013.

ArXived at: http://dx.doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.130.17 bibtex PDF
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