B. Bernheim, B. Peleg & M. Whinston (1987):
Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts.
Journal of Economic Theory 42(1),
pp. 1–12,
doi:10.1016/0022-0531(87)90099-8.
N. S. Kukushkin (2002):
Perfect Information and Potential Games.
Games and Economic Behavior 38(2),
pp. 306–317,
doi:10.1006/game.2001.0859.
S. Le Roux (2015):
Infinite subgame perfect equilibrium in the Hausdorff difference hierarchy.
In: Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi & Mohammad Reza Mousavi: Proceedings of TTCS 2015, International Conference on Topics in Theoretical Computer Science,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science 9541.
Springer,
pp. 147–163,
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-28678-5_11.
Available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1505.06320.
S. Le Roux & A. Pauly (2016):
A Semi-Potential for Finite and Infinite Sequential Games (Extended Abstract).
In: Domenico Cantone & Giorgio Delzanno: Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium on Games, Automata, Logics and Formal Verification, Catania, Italy, 14-16 September 2016,
Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 226.
Open Publishing Association,
pp. 242–256,
doi:10.4204/EPTCS.226.17.
J. Maynard Smith & G. R. Price (1973):
The Logic of Animal Conflict.
Nature 246,
pp. 15–18,
doi:10.1038/246015a0.
J. F. Nash, Jr. (1950):
Equilibrium points in n-person games.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the U.S.A. 36,
pp. 48–49,
doi:10.1073/pnas.36.1.48.