K. R. Apt & E. Markakis (2011):
Diffusion in Social Networks with Competing Products.
In: Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT),
Lecture Notes in Computer Science 6982.
Springer,
pp. 212–223,
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_20.
K. R. Apt, M. Rahn, G. Schäfer & S. Simon (2014):
Coordination Games on Graphs (extended abstract).
In: Proceedings of the 10th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE),
Lecture Notes in Computer Science 8877.
Springer,
pp. 441–446,
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_37.
K. R. Apt, M. Rahn, G. Schäfer & S. Simon (2015):
Coordination Games on Graphs.
Available from http://arxiv.org/abs/1501.07388.
K. R. Apt & S. Simon (2013):
Social Network Games with Obligatory Product Selection.
In: Proceedings 8th International Symposium on Games, Automata, Logics and Formal Verification (GandALF) 119.
Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science,
pp. 180–193,
doi:10.4204/EPTCS.119.
R. J. Aumann (1959):
Acceptable Points in General Cooperative N-person Games.
In: R. D. Luce & A. W. Tucker: Contribution to the theory of game IV, Annals of Mathematical Study 40.
University Press,
pp. 287–324.
S. Dasgupta, C.H. Papadimitriou & U. Vazirani (2006):
Algorithms.
McGraw-Hill.
T. Harks, M. Klimm & R.H. Möhring (2013):
Strong Equilibria in Games with the Lexicographical Improvement Property.
International Journal of Game Theory 42(2),
pp. 461–482,
doi:10.1007/s00182-012-0322-1.
R. Holzman & N. Law-Yone (1997):
Strong Equilibrium in Congestion Games.
Games and Economic Behavior 21(1-2),
pp. 85–101,
doi:10.1006/game.1997.0592.
M. Jackson & Y. Zenou (2014):
Games on Networks.
In: H. Peyton Young & Shmuel Zamir: Handbook of Game Theory 4.
Elsevier,
pp. 95–163,
doi:10.1016/B978-0-444-53766-9.00003-3.
M. Kearns, M. Littman & S. Singh (2001):
Graphical Models for Game Theory.
In: Proceedings of the 17th Conference in Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI '01).
Morgan Kaufmann,
pp. 253–260.
H. Konishi, M. Le Breton & S. Weber (1997):
Equivalence of Strong and Coalition-proof Nash Equilibria in Games without Spillovers.
Economic Theory 9(1),
pp. 97–113,
doi:10.1007/BF01213445.
H. Konishi, M. Le Breton & S. Weber (1997):
Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Group Formation Game with Positive Externalities.
Games and Economic Behaviour 21,
pp. 161–182,
doi:10.1006/game.1997.0542.
I. Milchtaich (1996):
Congestion Games with Player-Specific Payoff Functions.
Games and Economic Behaviour 13,
pp. 111–124,
doi:10.1006/game.1996.0027.
S. Simon & K. R. Apt (2015):
Social Network Games.
Journal of Logic and Computation 25(1),
pp. 207–242,
doi:10.1093/logcom/ext012.
E.B. Yanovskaya (1968):
Equilibrium Points in Polymatrix Games.
Litovskii Matematicheskii Sbornik 8,
pp. 381–384.
H. Peyton Young (1993):
The Evolution of Conventions.
Econometrica 61(1),
pp. 57–84,
doi:10.2307/2951778.
eptcs@eptcs.org