Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt & Markus Brill (2018):
On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness.
Games and Economic Behavior 110,
pp. 1–18,
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.005.
Jean-Pierre Benoit (2002):
Strategic Manipulation in Voting Games When Lotteries and Ties Are Permitted.
Journal of Economic Theory 102(2),
pp. 421–436,
doi:10.1006/jeth.2001.2794.
Anna Bogomolnaia & Hervé Moulin (2001):
A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem.
Journal of Economic Theory 100(2),
pp. 295–328,
doi:10.1006/jeth.2000.2710.
Felix Brandt (2017):
Rolling the dice: Recent results in probabilistic social choice.
In: Ulle Endriss: Trends in Computational Social Choice.
AI Access,
pp. 3–26.
Samir Chopra, Eric Pacuit & Rohit Parikh (2004):
Knowledge-theoretic properties of strategic voting.
In: Proceedings of the 8th European Conference on Logics in Artificial Intelligence (JELIA),
pp. 18–30,
doi:10.1007/11493402_15.
Vincent Conitzer, Tobby Walsh & Lirong Xia (2011):
Dominating manipulations in voting with partial information.
In: Proceedings of AAAI 2011,
pp. 638–643.
Vincent Conitzer & Toby Walsh (2016):
Barriers to Manipulation in Voting.
In: Handbook of Computational Social Choice.
Cambridge University Press,
pp. 127–145,
doi:10.1017/CBO9781107446984.007.
Keith Dowding & Martin Van Hees (2008):
In Praise of Manipulation.
British Journal of Political Science 38(1),
pp. 1–15,
doi:10.1017/S000712340800001X.
John Duggan & Thomas Schwartz (2000):
Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized.
Social Choice and Welfare 17(1),
pp. 85–93,
doi:10.1007/PL00007177.
Piotr Faliszewski & Ariel D. Procaccia (2010):
AI's War on Manipulation: Are We Winning?.
AI Magazine 31(4),
pp. 53–64,
doi:10.1609/aimag.v31i4.2314.
Allan M. Feldman (1980):
Strongly nonmanipulable multi-valued collective choice rules.
Public Choice 35(4),
pp. 503–509,
doi:10.1007/BF00128127.
Peter Gärdenfors (1976):
Manipulation of social choice functions.
Journal of Economic Theory 13,
pp. 217–228,
doi:10.1016/0022-0531(76)90016-8.
Allan Gibbard (1973):
Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result.
Econometrica 41(4),
pp. 587–601,
doi:10.2307/1914083.
Allan Gibbard (1977):
Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance.
Econometrica 45(3),
pp. 665–681,
doi:10.2307/1911681.
Georges-Théodule Guilbaud (1952):
Les théories de l'intéret genéral et le problémelogique de l'agrégation.
Economie Appliquée 5(4),
pp. 501–551.
Aanund Hylland (1980):
Strategy proofness of voting procedures with lotteries as outcomes and infinite sets of strategies.
University of Oslo.
Egor Ianovski, Lan Yu, Edith Elkind & Mark C. Wilson (2011):
The Complexity of Safe Manipulation under Scoring Rules.
In: Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
pp. 246–251,
doi:10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-052.
Richard Jeffrey (1971):
Statistical Explanation vs. Statistical Inference.
In: Wesley C. Salmon: Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance.
University of Pittsburgh Press,
pp. 19–28,
doi:10.2307/j.ctt6wrd9p.5.
Jerry S. Kelly (1977):
Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions Without Single-valuedness.
Econometrica 45(2),
pp. 439–446,
doi:10.2307/1911220.
Jerry S. Kelly (1985):
Minimal Manipulability and Local Strategy-Proofness.
Social Choice and Welfare 5(1),
pp. 81–85,
doi:10.1007/BF00435499.
Reshef Meir (2018):
Strategic Voting Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning.
Morgan & Claypool.
Samuel Merrill (1982):
Strategic voting in multicandidate elections under uncertainty and under risk.
In: Power, voting, and voting power.
Springer,
pp. 179–187,
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-00411-1_12.
Elchanan Mossel & Miklós Z. Rácz (2015):
A quantitative Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem without neutrality.
Combinatorica 35(3),
pp. 317–387,
doi:10.1007/s00493-014-2979-5.
Emerson M. S. Niou (1987):
A Note on Nanson's Rule.
Public Choice 54(2),
pp. 191–193,
doi:10.1007/BF00123006.
Shmuel Nitzan (1985):
The vulnerability of point-voting schemes to preference variation and strategic manipulation.
Public Choice 47(2),
pp. 349–370,
doi:10.1007/BF00127531.
Matias Nunez & Marcus Pivato (2019):
Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations.
Games and Economic Behaviour 113,
pp. 285–305,
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.009.
Martin Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein (2003):
Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting.
Games and Economic Behavior 45(2),
pp. 434–441,
doi:10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00147-7.
Eric Pacuit (2019):
Voting Methods.
In: Edward N. Zalta: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
Peter Railton (1981):
Probability, Explanation, and Information.
Synthese 48(2),
pp. 233–256,
doi:10.1007/BF01063889.
Annemieke Reijngoud & Ulle Endriss (2012):
Voter response to iterated poll information.
In: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
pp. 635–644.
Mark Satterthwaite (1973):
The Existence of a Strategy Proof Voting Procedure.
University of Wisconsin.
Mark Satterthwaite (1975):
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions.
Journal of Economic Theory 10(2),
pp. 187–217,
doi:10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2.
Arkadii Slinko (2002):
On Asymptotic Strategy-Proofness of Classical Social Choice Rules.
Theory and Decision 52(4),
pp. 389–398,
doi:10.1023/A:1020240214900.
Arkadii Slinko & Shaun White (2014):
Is it ever safe to vote strategically?.
Social Choice and Welfare 43(2),
pp. 403–427,
doi:10.1007/s00355-013-0785-4.
Alan D. Taylor (2005):
Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation.
Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge,
doi:10.1017/CBO9780511614316.
Hans van Ditmarsch, Jerome Lang & Abdallah Saffidine (2013):
Strategic voting and the logic of knowledge.
In: Proceedings of the 14th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK),
pp. 196–205.