References

  1. Robert J. Aumann (1976): Agreeing to disagree. The Annals of Statistics 4(6), pp. 1236–1239, doi:10.1214/aos/1176343654.
  2. Robert J. Aumann (1999): Interactive epistemology I: Knowledge. International Journal of Game Theory 28(3), pp. 263–300, doi:10.1007/s001820050111.
  3. B. Douglas Bernheim (1984): Rationalizable strategic behavior. Econometrica 52(4), pp. 1007–1028, doi:10.2307/1911196.
  4. Giacomo Bonanno (2002): Modal logic and game theory: two alternative approaches. Risk, Decision and Policy 7(3), pp. 309–324, doi:10.1017/s1357530902000704.
  5. Ronald Fagin, Joseph Y. Halpern, Yoram Moses & Moshe Y. Vardi (2003): Reasoning About Knowledge. MIT Press.
  6. Liangda Fang, Kewen Wang, Zhe Wang & Ximing Wen (2018): Knowledge compilation in multi-agent epistemic logics. arXiv: 1806.10561v2.
  7. James Garson (2018): Modal Logic. In: Edward N. Zalta: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, fall 2018 edition. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
  8. John Geanakoplos (1989): Game theory without partitions, and applications to speculation and consensus. Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 914. Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  9. James Hales (2016): Quantifying over epistemic updates. The University of Western Australia.
  10. James Hales, Tim French & Rowan Davies (2012): Refinement quantified logics of knowledge and belief for multiple agents. In: Advances in Modal Logic, Volume 9, pp. 317–338.
  11. Joseph Y Halpern & Gerhard Lakemeyer (2001): Multi-agent only knowing. Journal of Logic and Computation 11(1), pp. 41–70, doi:10.1093/logcom/11.1.41.
  12. Joseph Y. Halpern & Richard A. Shore (2004): Reasoning about common knowledge with infinitely many agents. Information and Computation 191(1), pp. 1–40, doi:10.1016/j.ic.2004.01.003.
  13. Jaakko Hintikka (1962): Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions. Cornell University Press.
  14. Xiao Huang, Biqing Fang, Hai Wan & Yongmei Liu (2018): A general multi-agent epistemic planner based on higher-order belief change. arXiv: 1806.11298v2.
  15. Mamoru Kaneko (2002): Epistemic logics and their game theoretic applications: Introduction. Economic Theory 19(1), pp. 7–62, doi:10.1007/s001990100202.
  16. Gerhard Lakemeyer & Yves Lespérance (2012): Efficient reasoning in multiagent epistemic logics. In: Proceedings of the 20th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI'12, pp. 498–503, doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-098-7-498.
  17. Philippe Lamarre & Yoav Shoham (1994): Knowledge, certainty, belief, and conditionalisation (abbreviated version). In: Jon Doyle, Erik Sandewall & Pietro Torasso: Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, The Morgan Kaufmann Series in Representation and Reasoning, pp. 415–424, doi:10.1016/b978-1-4832-1452-8.50134-2.
  18. Harvey Lederman (2015): People with common priors can agree to disagree. Review of Symbolic Logic 8(1), pp. 11–45, doi:10.1017/s1755020314000380.
  19. Wolfgang Lenzen (1978): Recent work in epistemic logic. Acta Philosophica Fennica 30(2), pp. 1–219.
  20. Qiang Liu & Yongmei Liu (2018): Multi-agent epistemic planning with common knowledge.. In: Proceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-18, pp. 1912–1920, doi:10.24963/ijcai.2018/264.
  21. John-Jules Ch Meyer & Wiebe van der Hoek (1995): Epistemic Logic for AI and Computer Science. Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511569852.
  22. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein (1994): A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press.
  23. Rohit Parikh & Paul Krasucki (1992): Levels of knowledge in distributed systems. Sadhana 17(1), pp. 167–191, doi:10.1007/bf02811342.
  24. Robert Stalnaker (1994): On the evaluation of solution concepts. Theory and Decision 37(1), pp. 49–73, doi:10.1007/bf01079205.
  25. Moshe Y. Vardi (1985): A model-theoretic analysis of monotonic knowledge. In: Proceedings of the 9th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-85, pp. 509–512.
  26. Arnis Vilks (1999): Knowledge of the game, relative rationality, and backwards induction without counterfactuals. Working Paper no.25, Leipzig Graduate School of Management.

Comments and questions to: eptcs@eptcs.org
For website issues: webmaster@eptcs.org