Robert J. Aumann (1976):
Agreeing to Disagree.
The Annals of Statistics 4(6),
pp. 1236–1239,
doi:10.1214/aos/1176343654.
Robert J. Aumann (1999):
Interactive Epistemology I, II.
International Journal of Game Theory 28(3),
pp. 263–300, 301–314.
doi:10.1007/s001820050112.
Michael Bacharach (1985):
Some Extensions of a Claim of Aumann in an Axiomatic Model of Knowledge.
Journal of Economic Theory 37(1),
pp. 167–190,
doi:10.1016/0022-0531(85)90035-3.
Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giacomo Bonanno (1999):
Recent Results on Belief, Knowledge and the Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory.
Research in Economics 53(2),
pp. 149–225,
doi:10.1006/reec.1999.0187.
Giacomo Bonanno (2002):
Information, Knowledge and Belief.
Bulletin of Economic Research 54(1),
pp. 47–67,
doi:10.1111/1467-8586.00139.
Giacomo Bonanno (2015):
Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory.
In: Hans van Ditmarsch, Joseph Y. Halpern, Wiebe van der Hoek & Barteld Pieter Kooi: Handbook of Epistemic Logic.
College Publications,
pp. 443–487.
Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring (1999):
How to Make Sense of the Common Prior Assumption under Incomplete Information.
International Journal of Game Theory 28(3),
pp. 409–434,
doi:10.1007/s001820050117.
Giacomo Bonanno & Elias Tsakas (2018):
Common Belief of Weak-dominance Rationality in Strategic-form Games: A Qualitative Analysis.
Games and Economic Behavior 112,
pp. 231–241,
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.003.
Adam Brandenburger & Eddie Dekel (1987):
Common Knowledge with Probability 1.
Journal of Mathematical Economics 16(3),
pp. 237–245,
doi:10.1016/0304-4068(87)90010-3.
Adam Brandenburger, Eddie Dekel & John Geanakoplos (1992):
Correlated Equilibrium with Generalized Information Structures.
Games and Economic Behavior 4(2),
pp. 182–201,
doi:10.1016/0899-8256(92)90014-J.
Eddie Dekel & Faruk Gul (1997):
Rationality and Knowledge in Game Theory.
In: David M. Kreps & Kenneth F. Wallis: Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Seventh World Congress 1.
Cambridge University Press,
pp. 87–172,
doi:10.1017/CCOL521580110.005.
Eddie Dekel, Barton L. Lipman & Aldo Rustichini (1998):
Standard State-Space Models Preclude Unawareness.
Econometrica 66(1),
pp. 159–173,
doi:10.2307/2998545.
Eddie Dekel & Marciano Siniscalchi (2015):
Epistemic Game Theory.
In: Petyon Young & Shmuel Zamir: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications 4.
Elsevier,
pp. 619–702,
doi:10.1016/B978-0-444-53766-9.00012-4.
Yossi Feinberg (2000):
Characterizing Common Priors in the Form of Posteriors.
Journal of Economic Theory 91(2),
pp. 127–179,
doi:10.1006/jeth.1999.2592.
Satoshi Fukuda (2019):
Epistemic Foundations for Set-algebraic Representations of Knowledge.
Satoshi Fukuda (2019):
The Existence of Universal Qualitative Belief Spaces.
Satoshi Fukuda (2019):
Formalizing Common Belief with No Underlying Assumption on Individual Beliefs.
Haim Gaifman (1988):
A Theory of Higher Order Probabilities.
In: Brian Skyrms & William Harper: Causation, Chance, and Credence.
Kluwer,
pp. 191–219,
doi:10.1007/978-94-009-2863-3_11.
John Geanakoplos (1989):
Games Theory without Partitions, and Applications to Speculation and Consensus.
Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 914.
Paolo Ghirardato (2001):
Coping with Ignorance: Unforeseen Contingencies and Non-additive Uncertainty.
Economic Theory 17(2),
pp. 247–276,
doi:10.1007/PL00004108.
Benjamin Golub & Stephen Morris (2017):
Higher-Order Expectations,
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2979089.
Joseph Y. Halpern (1991):
The Relationship between Knowledge, Belief, and Certainty.
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 4(3-4),
pp. 301–322,
doi:10.1007/BF01531062.
Joseph Y. Halpern (1996):
Should Knowledge Entail Belief?.
Journal of Philosphical Logic 25,
pp. 483–494,
doi:10.1007/BF00257382.
John C. Harsanyi (1967-1968):
Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian'' Players, I-III.
Management Science 14,
pp. 159–182, 320–334, 486–502.
doi:10.1287/mnsc.14.7.486.
Aviad Heifetz (2006):
The Positive Foundation of the Common Prior Assumption.
Games and Economic Behavior 56(1),
pp. 105–120,
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.06.002.
Aviad Heifetz, Martin Meier & Burkhard C. Schipper (2013):
Unawareness, Beliefs, and Speculative Trade.
Games and Economic Behavior 77(1),
pp. 100–121,
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2012.09.003.
Aviad Heifetz & Dov Samet (1998):
Knowledge Spaces with Arbitrarily High Rank.
Games and Economic Behavior 22(2),
pp. 260–273,
doi:10.1006/game.1997.0591.
Ziv Hellman (2011):
Iterated Expectations, Compact Spaces, and Common Priors.
Games and Economic Behavior 72(1),
pp. 163–171,
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2010.06.012.
Jaakko Hintikka (1962):
Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions.
Cornell University Press.
Wolfgang Lenzen (1978):
Recent Work in Epistemic Logic.
Acta Philosophica Fennica 30(2),
pp. 1–219.
Barton L. Lipman (1995):
Information Processing and Bounded Rationality: A Survey.
Canadian Journal of Economics 28(1),
pp. 42–67,
doi:10.2307/136022.
Martin Meier (2005):
On the Nonexistence of Universal Information Structures.
Journal of Economic Theory 122(1),
pp. 132–139,
doi:10.1016/j.jet.2003.07.003.
Martin Meier (2008):
Universal Knowledge-Belief Structures.
Games and Economic Behavior 62(1),
pp. 53–66,
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.03.001.
Jean François Mertens & Shmuel Zamir (1985):
Formulation of Bayesian Analysis for Games with Incomplete Information.
International Journal of Game Theory 14(1),
pp. 1–29,
doi:10.1007/BF01770224.
Salvatore Modica & Aldo Rustichini (1994):
Awareness and Partitional Information Structures.
Theory and Decision 37(1),
pp. 107–124,
doi:10.1007/BF01079207.
Salvatore Modica & Aldo Rustichini (1999):
Unawareness and Partitional Information Structures.
Games and Economic Behavior 27(2),
pp. 265–298,
doi:10.1006/game.1998.0666.
Dov Monderer & Dov Samet (1989):
Approximating Common Knowledge with Common Beliefs.
Games and Economic Behavior 1(2),
pp. 170–190,
doi:10.1016/0899-8256(89)90017-1.
Stephen Morris (1994):
Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information.
Econometrica 62(6),
pp. 1327–1347,
doi:10.2307/2951751.
Stephen Morris (1996):
The Logic of Belief and Belief Change: A Decision Theoretic Approach.
Journal of Economic Theory 69(1),
pp. 1–23,
doi:10.1006/jeth.1996.0035.
Sujoy Mukerji (1997):
Understanding the Nonadditive Probability Decision Model.
Economic Theory 9(1),
pp. 23–46,
doi:10.1007/BF01213441.
Zvika Neeman (1996):
Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Common p-Beliefs.
Games and Economic Behavior 12(1),
pp. 162–164,
doi:10.1006/game.1996.0011.
Klaus Nehring (2001):
Common Priors under Incomplete Information: a Unification.
Economic Theory 18(3),
pp. 535–553,
doi:10.1007/PL00004199.
Dov Samet (1990):
Ignoring Ignorance and Agreeing to Disagree.
Journal of Economic Theory 52(1),
pp. 190 – 207,
doi:10.1016/0022-0531(90)90074-T.
Dov Samet (1992):
Agreeing to Disagree in Infinite Information Structures.
International Journal of Game Theory 21(2),
pp. 213–218,
doi:10.1007/BF01245462.
Dov Samet (1998):
Iterated Expectations and Common Priors.
Games and Economic Behavior 24(1-2),
pp. 131–141,
doi:10.1006/game.1997.0616.
Dov Samet (1999):
Bayesianism without Learning.
Research in Economics 53(2),
pp. 227–242,
doi:10.1006/reec.1999.0186.
Dov Samet (2000):
Quantified Beliefs and Believed Quantities.
Journal of Economic Theory 95,
pp. 169–185,
doi:10.1006/jeth.2000.2670.
Hyun Song Shin (1993):
Logical Structure of Common Knowledge.
Journal of Economic Theory 60(1),
pp. 1–13,
doi:10.1006/jeth.1993.1032.
Robert Stalnaker (1994):
On the Evaluation of Solution Concepts.
Theory and Decision 37(1),
pp. 49–73,
doi:10.1007/BF01079205.
Tommy Chin-Chiu Tan & Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa Werlang (1988):
The Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games.
Journal of Economic Theory 45(2),
pp. 370–391,
doi:10.1016/0022-0531(88)90276-1.
Spyros Vassilakis & Shmuel Zamir (1993):
Common Belief and Common Knowledge.
Journal of Mathematical Economics 22(5),
pp. 495–505,
doi:10.1016/0304-4068(93)90039-N.
eptcs@eptcs.org